More Guidance Please: Proving Prejudicial Error under the APA by MacWilliam, Devon Hudson
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 39
Issue 3 Electronic Supplement Article 5
9-4-2012
More Guidance Please: Proving Prejudicial Error
under the APA
Devon Hudson MacWilliam
Boston College Law School, devon.macwilliam@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Energy Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Devon Hudson MacWilliam, More Guidance Please: Proving Prejudicial Error under the APA, 39 B.C.
Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. E. Supp. 55 (2012), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr/vol39/iss3/5
55 
                                                                                                                     
MORE GUIDANCE PLEASE: PROVING 
PREJUDICIAL ERROR UNDER THE APA 
Devon Hudson MacWilliam* 
Abstract: In response to widespread brown- and black-outs, Congress 
passed the Energy Policy Act in 2005. Under this Act, the Department of 
Energy must conduct a nationwide study of congestion in transmission 
lines every three years. Because the results of these studies may affect 
rights traditionally reserved to the states, DOE must prepare each study in 
consultation with affected states. In California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. 
Department of Energy, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that 
DOE failed to consult with affected states and applied a broad test to find 
an error that violated the harmless error doctrine. The dissent would 
have applied a more technical test thus concluded that a harmless error 
occurred. This Comment explores various harmless error tests and sug-
gests that litigation on this issue would be more predictable if the Su-
preme Court were to provide additional guidance for substantive and 
procedural errors. 
Introduction 
 On August 14, 2003, over 50 million people in the northeast and 
midwest United States and Canada lost power in a massive blackout.1 
Energy experts attributed this widespread blackout to transmission bot-
tlenecks and inadequate capacity relative to demand.2 Responding to 
this and other electrical brown- and black-outs, Congress passed the 
Energy Policy Act (EPAct) in 2005, authorizing the Department of En-
ergy (DOE) to designate national interest electric transmission corri-
dors (NIETC).3 Designation as an NIETC triggers the availability of a 
fast-track process through which utility companies can obtain transmis-
sion permits, circumventing state processes and authorizing the use of 
 
* Staff Writer, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review, 2011–12. 
1 U.S.–Canada Power Sys. Outage Task Force, Final Report on the August 14, 
2003 Blackout in the United States and Canada: Causes and Recommendations, at 
1 (2004), available at https://reports.energy.gov/BlackoutFinal-Web.pdf. 
2 David Firestone & Richard Pérez-Peña, THE BLACKOUT OF 2003: THE CONTEXT; 
Failure Reveals Creaky System, Experts Believe, N.Y. Times (Aug. 15, 2003), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2003/08/15/nyregion/15GRID.html?ref=newyorkcityblackoutof2003&pagewanted=1. 
3 Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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eminent domain, a power usually reserved to the states.4 Recognizing 
that the EPAct would increase the role of the federal government in 
transmission line development, Congress instructed DOE to develop 
transmission studies “in consultation with affected [s]tates.”5 
 Consultation requires “conferring with an entity before taking ac-
tion.”6 In California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Department of Energy, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that DOE failed to 
consult with affected states when it developed its first congestion study 
in 2006 (Congestion Study).7 Further, the court held that DOE’s ad-
ministrative error was not harmless under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA).8 Accordingly, the court vacated DOE’s Congestion 
Study.9 
 The California Wilderness Coalition majority determined that com-
plainants adequately demonstrated that DOE’s failure to consult vio-
lated the harmless error doctrine.10 The dissent asserted, however, that 
the court made a mistake in vacating DOE’s Congestion Study because 
the complainants failed to “offer even a scintilla of evidence to establish 
prejudice.”11 These different conclusions arose from disagreement 
within the court regarding the standard with which to judge complain-
ants’ evidence.12 While the U.S. Supreme Court recently confirmed 
that the complainant carries the burden to persuade the court that er-
ror was not harmless, it refrained from enumerating additional criteria 
by which lower courts should make these judgments.13 As a result, 
harmless error jurisprudence lacks predictability and complainants do 
not have sufficient guidance to draft arguments on appeal.14 
                                                                                                                      
4 See id at 1080, 1101. 
5 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(1) (2006); Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1087. 
6 Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1087. 
7 Id. at 1107. 
8 Id. at 1090. 
9 Id. at 1095. 
10 Id. at 1093. 
11 Id. at 1107 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
12 Compare Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1091–92 (majority opinion) (requiring 
complainant to show that agency error impacted the procedure used or substance of the 
decision reached), with id. at 1111 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (requiring complainant to present 
facts that mount a credible challenge or identify omissions in procedure that demonstrate 
unreliability of agency decision). 
13 See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1707 (2009). The Supreme Court lists vari-
ous factors that “inform a reviewing court’s ‘harmless-error’ determination,” however it 
“hesitat[es] to generalize too broadly about particular kinds of errors when the specific 
factual circumstances in which the error arises may well make all the difference.” Id. 
14 See Craig Smith, Taking “Due Account” of the APA’s Prejudicial-Error Rule, 96 Va. L. Rev. 
1727, 1753–54 (2010). 
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 This Comment argues that not all agency errors are alike and that 
different types of error deserve different treatment within the harmless 
error doctrine.15 As the California Wilderness Coalition case exemplifies, 
errors like DOE’s failure to consult with affected states may be so obvi-
ously harmful that the court can make that determination without ap-
plication of a defined test.16 This Comment further suggests that sub-
stantive errors should be judged according to an outcome-based 
standard, while procedural errors should be judged according to a re-
cord-based standard.17 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 In 2005, Congress passed the EPAct, adding § 216 to the Federal 
Power Act (FPA).18 Responding to electrical brown- and black-outs 
across the nation, the first provision of § 216 establishes a procedure 
through which DOE may designate NIETCs.19 Designation is significant 
because utility companies are granted a “fast-track approval process” for 
transmission line permits within the geographic boundaries of any 
NIETC.20 Although designation is federal, the fast-track process affects 
the rights of state and local governments.21 For instance, if a state 
agency does not approve a transmission line permit within one year of 
application, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is au-
thorized to disrupt the state process and issue permits within NIETC 
boundaries directly.22 When such FERC-issued permits are located on 
private property, § 216 further authorizes the applicant utility company 
to exercise eminent domain to acquire necessary rights-of-way, a power 
traditionally reserved to the states.23 
 The NIETC designation procedure established under § 216 in-
volves two steps.24 First, every three years the Secretary of Energy must 
conduct and issue an energy transmission study “in consultation with 
affected [s]tates.”25 Second, after a notice and comment period, the 
                                                                                                                      
15 See infra notes 111–115 and accompanying text. 
16 See Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1706; Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1093. 
17 See infra notes 101–124 and accompanying text. 
18 Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2011). 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See id. at 1087. 
22 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b)(1)(C) (2006). 
23 Id. § 824p(e); Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1101. 
24 16 U.S.C. § 824p(a). 
25 Id. § 824p(a)(1). 
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Secretary must issue a report—based on the energy transmission 
study—where NIETCs may be designated.26 
 Pursuant to the deadline established in § 216, DOE issued its first 
energy transmission study in August 2006.27 While preparing the Con-
gestion Study, DOE accepted input from interested parties and held a 
series of outreach meetings.28 On February 2, 2006, DOE issued a no-
tice in the Federal Register with its first request for comments.29 While 
indicating that the Congestion Study was already “well underway,” the 
notice invited responses to four specific questions as well as feedback 
regarding DOE’s eight draft criteria and corresponding metrics.30 DOE 
also announced a technical conference “to allow participants to discuss 
key issues.”31 A number of states sent representatives to the technical 
conference and some of these representatives served as panelists.32 Ad-
ditionally, DOE hosted a series of invitation-only meetings from which 
state entities were excluded,33 and it had sixty-two outreach meetings 
with industry organizations, two of which were with various state offi-
cials.34 
 When DOE published the Congestion Study, it solicited public 
comment and contacted the executive offices of each potential NIETC 
state.35 In May 2007, DOE responded to the over four hundred com-
                                                                                                                      
26 Id. § 824p(a)(2). 
27 Id. § 824p(a)(1); U.S. Dep’t of Energy. National Electric Transmission Conges-
tion Study (2006), available at http://nietc.anl.gov/documents/docs/Congestion_Study_ 
2006–9MB.pdf [hereinafter Congestion Study]. 
28 Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1080–81; see, e.g., Congestion Study, supra note 27, 
app. G at 91–93. 
29 Considerations for Transmission Congestion Study and Designation of National In-
terest Electric Transmission Corridors, 71 Fed. Reg. 5660, 5660 (Feb. 2, 2006). 
30 See id. at 5661–62. DOE invited responses to the following questions: 
(1) Should the Department distinguish between persistent congestion and 
dynamic congestion . . . ? (2) Should the Department distinguish between 
physical congestion and contractual congestion . . . ? (3) . . . [W]hat existing, 
specific transmission studies . . . should the Department review? . . . (4)What 
categories of information would be most useful to include in the congestion 
study to develop geographic areas of interest? 
Id. at 5662. 
31 Id. at 5660, 5663. 
32 Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1081. 
33 Id. 
34 See id. at 1094 n.20; Congestion Study, supra note 27, app. G at 91–93. 
35 Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1082. DOE received 148 comments from organizations 
including affected states. Search Comments, Office of Elec. Delivery & Energy Reliability, 
http://nietc.anl.gov/involve/searchcomment/index.cfm (click Search by Organization drop-
down window and select {any organization}; then follow “Search” hyperlink). 
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ments it received regarding the Congestion Study and solicited com-
ments on draft NIETCs.36 Finally, on October 5, 2007, DOE issued a 
final ruling in which it designated two NIETCs: the Mid-Atlantic corri-
dor and the Southwest corridor.37 In its formal order, DOE rejected” all 
comments recommending different approaches.”38 
 In response to DOE’s formal order, the California Wilderness Coa-
lition and eight other citizen groups and states filed requests to stay the 
NIETC designations with the DOE.39 DOE rejected these requests.40 
Pursuant to the statutory grant of federal appellate jurisdiction,41 the 
California Wilderness Coalition and other parties filed petitions for 
review within the sixty day statutory window.42 The Ninth Circuit con-
solidated these petitions for review,43 ruled in favor of petitioners, and 
held that “DOE failed to consult with the affected States in undertaking 
the Congestion Study as required by § 824p(a)(1)” and that such error 
was not harmless.44 
II. Legal Background 
 The APA authorizes judicial review of agency actions.45 In addition 
to declaring agency action unlawful,46 a court may vacate agency ac-
tions when an agency violates required procedures.47 
 The standard of review for agency actions was established in Chev-
ron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.48 Chevron out-
lined a two-phase test to determine whether an agency acted lawfully in 
interpreting relevant statutes and following necessary procedures.49 
First, the court must determine whether “Congress has directly spoken 
                                                                                                                      
36 Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability; Draft National Interest Electric 
Transmission Corridor Designations, 72 Fed. Reg. 25,838, 25,839–40 (May. 7, 2007). 
37 National Electric Transmission Congestion Report, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,992, 56,992 
(Oct. 5, 2007). 
38 Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1083. 
39 National Electric Transmission Congestion Report; Order Denying Rehearing, 73 
Fed. Reg. 12,959, 12,962, 12,966 (Mar. 11, 2008). 
40 Id. 
41 16 U.S.C. § 825l (2006). 
42 Id.; Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1083. 
43 Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1083. 
44 Id. at 1079. 
45 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. § 706(2)(d). 
48 Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1083 (9th Cir. 2011). 
See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
49 See 467 U.S. at 842. 
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to the precise question at issue.”50 When Congress has “unambiguously 
expressed” its intent, both the reviewing court and agency in question 
must follow the language of the statute.51 When a statute is “silent or 
ambiguous” on the precise question at issue, however, the court must 
uphold agency action provided it is based “on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.”52 This standard is so “highly deferential” that the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals presumes “agency action to be valid.”53 
 Even when a court finds an agency did not follow a required pro-
cedure, it only vacates an action when it violates the harmless error 
doctrine.54 This interpretation of the APA, which instructs courts to 
take “due account” of prejudicial error,55 requires that courts deter-
mine whether an error had a “bearing on the procedure used or the 
substance of [a] decision reached” before issuing a remedy.56 
 Decades of Ninth Circuit precedent reinforces the harmless error 
doctrine for agency review pursuant to the APA.57 For instance, in Sage-
brush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, the Ninth Circuit upheld an erroneous 
agency action because the purpose of the statute’s provision was fully 
satisfied.58 The Sagebrush plaintiffs alleged that the Department of the 
Interior (Interior) violated the notice and hearing requirements of the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).59 The 
Ninth Circuit agreed that Interior did not “comply in every respect with 
the terms” of FLPMA.60 The court explained, however, that “[a]n 
agency may rely on harmless error only when its ‘mistake . . . is one that 
clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of deci-
                                                                                                                      
50 Id. at 842. 
51 Id. at 842–43. 
52 Id. at 843. 
53 Nw. Ecosystems Alliance v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 475 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
54 See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1704 (2009); Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 
1090; Paulsen v. Daniels, 413 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2005). 
55 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006). 
56 See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 379 F.2d 453, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
In 1949, Congress codified the common law harmless error doctrine, requiring that courts 
of appeals examine the records of lower tribunals “without regard to errors or defects 
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (2006). 
57 See, e.g., Paulsen, 413 F.3d at 1006; Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 
1487 (9th Cir. 1992); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 764–65 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
58 See Sagebrush, 790 F.2d at 764–65. 
59 Id. at 761. 
60 Id. at 764. 
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sion reached.’”61 Applying this reasoning, the court found the violation 
was a harmless error because the plaintiffs received “a full and fair op-
portunity to be heard” through a parallel notice and comment proce-
dure administered under another statute.62 
 Relying on the reasoning of Sagebrush, the Ninth Circuit in River-
bend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan emphasized the importance of applying the 
harmless error rule to both the result of an agency action as well as the 
process: 
An agency is not required to adopt a rule that conforms in 
any way to the comments presented to it. . . . Thus, if the 
harmless error rule were to look solely to result, an agency 
could always claim that it would have adopted the same rule 
even if it had complied with APA procedures. To avoid gutting 
the APA’s procedural requirements, harmless error analysis in 
administrative rulemaking must therefore focus on the proc-
ess as well as the result.63 
Applying the harmless error rule in Riverbend—a case in which navel 
orange growers alleged that the Secretary of Agriculture failed to com-
ply with the notice and comment provisions of the APA—the Ninth 
Circuit held that the administrative error was harmless.64 Because the 
Secretary of Agriculture followed a “system of regulation . . . for dec-
ades without challenge,” where all parties “knew the ground rules,”65 
the court concluded that the procedural deviation from the statute was 
a harmless error.66 
 In contrast, in Paulsen v. Daniels, the Ninth Circuit held that a Bu-
reau of Prisons omission of the notice and comment procedure under 
the APA was not harmless error.67 Unlike Sagebrush and Riverbend, 
where alternative procedures satisfied the purpose of notice and com-
ment, the court found that the Bureau of Prisons failed to give the 
plaintiffs sufficient opportunity “to participate in the rulemaking proc-
ess before the . . . agency adopted the rule.”68 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 765 (emphasis added) (quoting Buschmann v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d 352, 358 
(9th Cir. 1982) (internal quotations omitted)). 
62 Id. at 769. 
63 958 F.2d at 1487. 
64 Id. at 1487–88. 
65 Id. 
66 Id.at 1488. 
67 Paulsen, 413 F.3d at 1002, 1007. 
68 Id. 
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 The above examples of Ninth Circuit precedent illustrate that 
courts must evaluate the facts of a case to determine whether a devia-
tion constitutes harmless error.69 In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
in Shinseki v. Sanders that the burden of proof in such cases is on the 
complainant.70 The plaintiff, a World War II veteran, was denied dis-
ability benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).71 In re-
sponse to plaintiff’s arguments that the VA made a procedural error,72 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that VA 
“notice errors should be presumed prejudicial, requiring reversal 
unless the VA can show that the error did not affect the essential fair-
ness of the adjudication.”73 
 Reviewing the decision of the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court 
reversed.74 The Court held that the Federal Circuit’s framework was 
inconsistent with the APA statutory requirement that courts “take due 
account of the rule of prejudicial error” when ruling on agency ac-
tions.75 The Federal Circuit’s “complex, rigid, and mandatory” frame-
work imposed an “unreasonably high evidentiary” burden on the VA.76 
The Supreme Court held that precedent requires case-by-case adjudica-
tion, noting that the Federal Circuit’s framework “differ[ed] signifi-
cantly from the approach courts normally take in ordinary civil 
cases.”77 Whereas the Federal Circuit framework presumed agency er-
ror was not harmless and put the burden of proving otherwise on the 
agency, the Supreme Court explained that the burden of showing error 
should be on “the party attacking the agency’s determination.”78 
                                                                                                                     
 Courts have taken a variety of approaches regarding what a claim-
ant must show to persuade the court that agency error was not harm-
less.79 Although not explicit in every opinion, courts sometimes begin 
 
69 See id. at 1006–07 (summarizing fact specific harmless error analyses of Riverbend 
Farms and Sagebrush). 
70 See Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1706. 
71 Id. at 1701. 
72 Id. at 1702. 
73 Sanders v. Nicholson, 487 F.3d 881, 889 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
74 Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1708. 
75 Id. at 1700 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2) (2006)). Although Sanders interprets the 
statutory language of a code provision specific for appeals to the Veterans Court, the ma-
jority mandates that the Veterans Court treat its appeals as courts treat civil cases under the 
APA, applying the harmless error doctrine. Id. at 1704. 
76 See id. at 1704–05. 
77 Id. 
78 See id. at 1705–06. 
79 See Smith, supra note 14, at 1739. 
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their inquiry by determining whether the agency error was substantive 
or procedural in nature.80 
 In substantive error cases, courts often apply an outcome-based 
standard.81 For instance, Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board 
involved a contested award by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to 
Eastern Air Lines of air routes from Florida to Texas.82 In 1967, the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia agreed that CAB violated 
the APA when this award was “unsupported by substantial evidence.”83 
In applying the harmless error doctrine to this substantive error, the 
D.C. Circuit asked whether the agency would have drawn the same 
conclusion without the error.84 Finding substantial doubt that this was 
the case, the D.C. Circuit concluded the error was not harmless.85 
 In Kurzon v. U.S. Postal Service—a 1976 substantive error case—the 
plaintiff alleged that the Postal Service erred when it put a mail-stop on 
the plaintiff’s advertisements.86 The Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit held that the record contained substantial evidence to support the 
several Postal Service decisions.87 In the one case of agency error, the 
court applied an outcome-based standard: substantive agency decisions 
should be vacated only when there is substantial doubt that “the admin-
istrative agency would have made the same ultimate finding with the 
erroneous finding removed from the picture.”88 Not persuaded that 
this was the case, the court determined that the agency error was harm-
less.89 
                                                                                                                      
80 See City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1220 (9th Cir. 2004). Compare Kurzon 
v. U.S. Postal Serv., 539 F.2d 788, 796 (1st Cir. 1976) (substantive error implicit in analysis), 
and Braniff Airways, Inc., 379 F.2d at 466–67 (substantive error implicit in analysis), with 
Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 183 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (procedural error explicit in analy-
sis). One source of inconsistency in the treatment of substantive and procedural error 
cases may be the “hazy” line “between procedural and substantive law.” See Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 92 (1938). 
81 See, e.g., Kurzon, 539 F.2d at 796; Braniff Airways, Inc., 379 F.2d at 466. 
82 379 F.2d at 458. 
83 See id. at 462–63. Braniff Airways is often cited for the proposition that only adminis-
trative error “that clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or the substance of deci-
sion reached” is not harmless. Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1091 n.14; Kurzon, 539 F.2d 
at 796. However, the D.C. Circuit applied an outcome-based standard to the facts of the 
case in Braniff Airways. 379 F.2d at 466. 
84 Braniff Airways, Inc., 379 F.2d at 465–66. 
85 Id. at 466–67. 
86 See 539 F.2d at 792. 
87 See id. at 794. 
88 Id. at 796 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
89 Id. at 796–97. 
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 In contrast, when agency error is procedural in nature, courts tend 
to use analyses that focus more on process and less on the outcome of 
agency decisions.90 In Gerber v. Norton—a 2002 procedural error case— 
the D.C. Circuit utilized a record-based test.91 The plaintiffs challenged 
a permit issued by the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) to a residential 
community development for “the incidental taking of Delmarva fox 
squirrels.”92 In their challenge, the plaintiffs asserted that FWS violated 
the APA and Endangered Species Act (ESA) when the agency failed to 
publish a map of a mitigation site during the notice and comment pe-
riod.93 After finding this withholding was agency error, the D.C. Circuit 
asserted that it would find the error harmful only if the complainant 
could indicate “with reasonable specificity what portions of the docu-
ments it object[ed] to and how it might have responded if given the 
opportunity.”94 By pointing out specific issues they would have identi-
fied had they been shown the mitigation site map, the plaintiffs met 
this burden.95 
 Unlike the Gerber record-based standard, in City of Sausalito v. 
O’Neill, another procedural error case, the court utilized a more gen-
eral harm-based standard.96 Here, plaintiffs alleged that the National 
Park Service (NPS) violated the ESA by preparing a biological assess-
ment of listed species outside the ESA mandated 180-day window.97 
Recognizing this violation, the Ninth Circuit categorized the error as 
one of tardiness.98 As a case where “the agency’s error consisted of a 
failure to comply with regulations in a timely fashion,” the Ninth Cir-
cuit queried whether the plaintiffs could identify “the prejudice they 
have suffered.”99 Finding that plaintiffs failed to point to harm result-
ing from NPS’s delay, the Ninth Circuit concluded the agency error was 
harmless.100 
                                                                                                                      
90 See, e.g., Riverbend Farms, 958 F.2d at 1487. 
91 See 294 F.3d at 182–83. 
92 Id. at 176. 
93 Id. at 178. 
94 Id. at 182 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
95 Id. at 182, 184. 
96 Compare Gerber, 294 F.3d at 182 (record-based test), with City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 
1220 (harm-based test). 
97 City of Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1220. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 See id. 
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III. Analysis 
 Neither the majority nor dissent in California Wilderness Coalition v. 
U.S. Department of Energy challenged the holding of Shinseki v. Sanders— 
in cases of unlawful agency action, the party challenging the agency 
action has the burden of showing that administrative error was not 
harmless.101 Rather, the two opinions disagree about what a complain-
ant must show to persuade an appellate court that agency error is not 
harmless, an issue about which Sanders is silent.102 In this case, the ma-
jority appropriately categorized failure to consult as both substantive 
and procedural error,103 but the standard it applied should be re-
formulated in light of Sanders, to remove the semblance of a presump-
tion of prejudicial error.104 Although the dissent presented a test that is 
generally more appropriate for harmless error cases, it erroneously 
categorized the failure to consult as procedural, a characterization that 
colors the remainder of the dissent’s analysis.105 California Wilderness 
Coalition thus demonstrates how, until the Supreme Court articulates 
additional guidance for the lower courts, there is a gap in administra-
tive law jurisprudence that results in a lack of predictability for such 
cases.106 
 The California Wilderness Coalition dissent would have interpreted 
Sanders as “reject[ing] the presumption of prejudice articulated in Riv-
erbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan” and its progeny, and concluded the com-
plainants in this case failed to prove prejudice from DOE’s unlawful 
actions.107 The dissent analogized DOE’s failure to consult to notice 
and comment error cases.108 In particular, the dissent implicitly relied 
on the Gerber v. Norton test in which the D.C. Circuit held that a com-
plainant can show harmful procedural error only when it “indicate[s] 
with ‘reasonable specificity’ what portions of the documents it objects 
to and how it might have responded if given the opportunity.”109 Apply-
                                                                                                                      
101 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1091–92 (9th Cir. 
2011). Sanders is an uncontroversial ruling, restating lower court holdings from the past six 
decades. Smith, supra note 14, at 1728. 
102 See Shinseki v. Sanders, 129 S. Ct. 1696, 1706–07 (2009); Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 
F.3d at 1090, 1092–93; Smith, supra note 14, at 1728. 
103 See Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1093. 
104 See id. at 1091–92; id. at 1111–12 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
105 See id. at 1093 (majority opinion); id. at 1111–17 (Ikuta, J., dissenting); Smith, supra 
note 14, at 1744. 
106 See Smith, supra note 14, at 1753. 
107 Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1097–98 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
108 See id. at 1110–11. 
109 See id. at 1111; Gerber v. Norton, 294 F.3d 173, 182 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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ing this standard to California Wilderness Coalition, the dissent would 
have queried whether complainants were denied the opportunity to 
present “specific information or arguments [to DOE] . . . because of 
the lack of consultation.”110 
 Although it referenced an outcome-based test—often used for 
substantive errors—in passing, the dissent primarily analogized failure 
to consult to notice and comment errors, thus emphasizing the proce-
dural aspect of the error.111 Though procedural on its face—the EPAct 
requires that DOE consult with affected states—the purpose of consul-
tation is “the desirability of the interactive process itself.”112 In contrast, 
notice and comment provisions are a means by which agencies gather 
information in promulgating rulings.113 Contrary to the dissent’s analy-
sis, these errors are not alike, and should not be treated the same un-
der the harmless error doctrine.114 Thus while the dissent’s proposed 
test may be clear and administrable for procedural errors, application 
of this notice-based standard to the facts of this case is inappropriate.115 
 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit majority acknowledged that failure 
to consult is more than procedural error, but it struggled to assert an 
appropriate test.116 Instead of analyzing DOE’s error systematically, us-
ing the most appropriate standard, the majority briefly discussed re-
cord-, harm-, and outcome-based tests before implicitly resorting to pol-
icy dicta from Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board.117 Here, the 
court attempted to reconcile the Sanders holding with the standard of 
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel and Riverbend Farms—that an error is 
not harmless unless it clearly had no bearing on the procedure used or 
the substance of decision reached.118 This broad standard is appealing 
because failure to consult has substantive as well as procedural compo-
nents.119 The “clearly had no bearing” language, however, maintains an 
                                                                                                                      
110 Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1108 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
111 See id. at 1108, 1110–11; Smith, supra note 14, at 1739. 
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113 See Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1092. 
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115 See id. at 1092–93. 
116 See id. at 1093. 
117 See id. at 1093–94.The majority would conclude the failure to consult was not harm-
less under the Gerber results-based test, a harm-based test like that of City of Sausalito v. 
O’Neill, or the outcome-based test of Kurzon v. U.S. Postal Office. Id. at 1093. 
118 See id. at 1091–92; see also Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d 1479, 1487 
(9th Cir. 1992); Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 1986). 
119 See Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1093. 
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appearance of the presumption of prejudice, and therefore is no 
longer appropriate after Sanders.120 
 Despite its analyses under record-, harm-, and outcome-based tests 
and the “clearly had no bearing” threshold, the majority’s strongest as-
sertion of harmful error is that “the prejudice to the party excluded 
[from consultation] is obvious.”121 Here, the majority could have used 
dicta from Sanders to carve out an exception from the tests proposed by 
the dissent.122 The Supreme Court, in reasoning towards the Sanders 
holding, remarked that “[o]ften the circumstances of the case will 
make clear to the appellate judge that the ruling, if erroneous, was 
harmful and nothing further need be said.”123 Once the Ninth Circuit es-
tablished that “the impact of the lack of consultation before a decision 
is made . . . is particularly severe” and the prejudice to the affected 
states is obvious, it could have determined that the erroneous action 
was harmful under this Sanders carve-out.124 
Conclusion 
 As California Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Department of Energy demon-
strates, harmless error jurisprudence contains significant gaps and am-
biguities.125 Through Shinseki v. Sanders, the Supreme Court reiterated 
to lower courts that the party attacking procedural error bears the bur-
den of proving such error was harmful.126 Courts apply numerous itera-
tions of a variety of tests for the harmless error doctrine, however, in-
cluding notice-, harm-, and outcome-based standards.127 Application of 
these various tests is inconsistent, producing unpredictability in this 
area of law.128 Because of this unpredictability, complainants do not 
know what they must assert to successfully challenge agency actions.129 
Complainants deserve greater predictability, and the disagreement be-
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tween the majority and dissent in California Wilderness Coalition illus-
trates how lower courts need additional guidance.130 
 Not all error is alike;131 however, agency errors generally are sub-
stantive, procedural, or some combination of the two.132 Although 
courts are inconsistent in their characterizations of error, these catego-
ries are significant and deserving of different harmless error stan-
dards.133 By developing bright line rules with an outcome-based stan-
dard for substantive errors, a record-based standard for procedural 
errors, and a carve-out for cases where the circumstances clearly indi-
cate that the erroneous ruling was harmful, the Supreme Court could 
stabilize an important area of administrative law.134 
 
130 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 
2011); id. at 1111 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
131 See id. at 1093 (majority opinion). 
132 See id.; Smith, supra note 14, at 1729. 
133 See Cal. Wilderness Coal., 631 F.3d at 1094 n.21. 
134 See Sanders, 129 S. Ct. at 1706; Smith, supra note 14, at 1753–54. 
